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CALIFORNIA'S NEW HOUSEHOLD GOODS
EXEMPTION AND THE PROBLEM OF
PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
California is THE state in which to be a debtor or bankrupt.'

Even though the judgment creditor has the legal remedy of levying
2
against a debtor's property, that right has been significantly limited.
The California legislature has made ample provision for the protection of the debtor's personal wealth by allowing a generous amount

of personal property to be exempt from levy of execution by cred-

of
itors.3 The principal exemption statutes in California are Code
other
many
although
690.29,4
Civil Procedure sections 690 through
5
a
statutes provide for exemptions. The California debtor can retain
6

sizeable amount of wealth while he remains indebted to others. The
creditor who is without a perfected security interest must locate
property of the debtor which will be both subject to levy of execution
and valuable enough to provide a reasonable return at the sheriff's
sale to warrant the costs involved.

of
I "The bulk of the bankrupt's exemptions will be those allowed under the law
the state in which the case is filed....
a sub"The variations in laws between the states is considerable. If a debtor has
and
stantial amount of assets, he may find it to his advantage to move to California
is the most
establish the necessary residence before filing bankruptcy, for that state
589 at 326 (1963).
generous to debtors." D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE §people,
sealed with
2 "The writ of execution must be issued in the name of the
directed to the
the seal of the court, and subscribed by the clerk or judge, and be
stating
sheriff, constable, or marshal, and it must intelligibly refer to the judgment,
thereof,
amount
the
money,
for
be
it
if
and
entered,
is
judgment
the
the court ... where
to whom it is
and the amount actually due thereon .. .and must require the officer
directed to proceed substantially as follows:
of the
1. Property or earnings of judgment debtor. If it be against the property
interest,
with
judgment,
the
satisfy
to
officer
such
require
judgment debtor, it must
personal property
out of the personal property of such debtor . . . and if sufficient
§ 682 (West
cannot be found, then out of his real property .... ." CAL. CIv. PRo. CODE
Supp. 1971).
3 Id. §§ 690-690.29 (West Supp. 1971).
4

Id.

EDUC. CODE § 13808
5 For example, Teachers' Retirement Fund deposits, CAL.
CODE § 31067 (West
EDUC.
CAL.
use,
public
to
granted
(West Supp. 1971); property
§ 15406 (West 1968) ;
1969) ; deposits in a credit union up to $1,500, CAL. FIN. CODE
CODE § 9359.3 (West
California Legislator's Retirement Fund deposits, CAL. GOV'T.
GOV'T. CODE § 21201
CAL.
deposits,
Fund
Retirement
Employee's
State
1966); California
§ 10213 (West
CODE
INS.
CAL.
payments,
policy
(West 1963) ; group life insurance
§ 11045
society and fraternal benefit society payments, CAL. INs. CODE

1955); insurance
(West 1955).
declare a home6 The head of a family or a person 65 years of age or older can
on his dwelling, and all
stead to the value of $20,000 above all liens and encumbrances
other persons are allowed a homestead exemption of $10,000. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1260(1,
the debtor or spouse, one
3) (West Supp. 1971). If a homestead is not declared by
is exempt. CAL.
encumbrances
and
liens
all
above
house trailer to a value of $5,000
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This comment will examine one section of the exemption provisions,' Code of Civil Procedure section 690.1.8 This
section exempts
from levy of execution, upon the filing of a claim
by the debtor,
Necessary household furnishings and appliances
and wearing apparel,
ordinarily and reasonably necessary to, and
personally used by, the
debtor and his resident family, including, but not
limited to, one piano;
one radio and one television receiver; provisions
and fuel actually
provided for the debtor and his resident family's
use, sufficient for three
months; one shotgun and one rifle. Works of
art shall not be exempt
unless of or by the debtor and his resident family.9

This provision was enacted in 1970 and greatly updates
and modern-

izes the similar provision which was then
section 690.2.10 The new
code section removes outdated and nonfunctional
provisions, such
as the specific exemption of stoves and stovepipes,
cows and their
suckling calves and hogs and their suckling
pigs. Even though it is
a significant improvement over the section which
it replaces, the new
law is nevertheless inadequate.
Both the old and the new code sections
exempt "necessary"
furniture and wearing apparel." Neither provision
explains what is
meant by that term. Both sections offer examples,
but also require
judicial interpretation. This vagueness is an
unnecessary shortcoming in the statute and should be corrected by
appropriate legislation.
Because the determination of the character,
amount, and value
of the property to be exempt from levy
is purely a question of
legislative policy, 12 the exemption statutes should
be written clearly
CIv. PRO. CODE § 690.3 (West Supp. 1971). Each
keep up to $i,000 on deposit in any state or federalperson in the debtor's family may
savings and loan association, CAL.
CIV. PRO. CODE § 690.7 (West Supp. 1971).

7 For broader discussions of exemption
statutes, and several sound recommendations for their modernization, see Abrahams &
Feldman, The Exemption of Wages From
Garnishment: Some Comparisons and Comments,
3 DE PAuL L. REV. 153 (1954);
Gudgel, Debtor Exemptions in PersonalProperty-Proposals
for Modernization, 52 Ky.
L.J. 456 (1964); Joslin, Debtor's Exemption
Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND.
L.J. 355 (1955); King, The Enforcement of Money
Judgments in California, 11 S. CAL.
L. REv. 224 (1938); Rifkind, Archaic Exemption
Laws, 39 CALIF. S.B.J. 370 (1961).
8 CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE § 690.1 (West Supp. 1971).
9 Id.
10 The older version exempted "[n]ecessary
household, table, and kitchen furniture
belonging to the judgment debtor, including
one refrigerator, washing machine, sewing
machine, stove, stovepipes and furniture; wearing
apparel, beds, bedding and bedsteads,
hanging pictures, oil paintings and drawings
drawn or painted by any member of the
family, and family portraits and their necessary
frames, provisions and fuel actually
provided for individual or family use, sufficient
for
their suckling calves, four hogs and their suckling three months, and three cows and
pigs, and food for such cows and
hogs for one month; also one radio, one television
receiver, one piano, one shotgun and
one rifle." Cal. Stats. 1935 ch. 723, § 3, at 1967
(1935).
11 Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 723, § 3, at 1967 (1935),
as amended, CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE
§ 690.1 (West Supp. 1971).
12 Spence v. Smith, 121 Cal. 536, 538, 53 P. 653
(1898) ; In re Klemp's Estate, 119
Cal. 41, 50 P. 1062 (1897).
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COMMENTS

for their
so as to provide maximum guidance to those responsible
lead
may
implementation; as will be shown, judicial interpretation
exemption
to unfair results. Case holdings on the household goods
of the
provisions have generally provided for a liberal interpretation
the
that
is
section for the benefit of the debtor.'" The problem
pendulum may have swung a bit too far in the debtor's direction,
reasons. First, the
providing a result which is unsatisfactory for two
within the housegranting of excessive amounts of personal property
of the
effectiveness
the
reduces
hold goods exemption significantly
of
property
personal
the
against
execute
creditor's legal remedy to
judicial
the debtor. Second, an unfair and perhaps unconstitutional when a
occurs
debtor
poor
the
and
discrimination between the rich
the exemption statrelatively wealthy debtor claims the benefits of
is allowed to retain
wealth
his
of
utes. The wealthy debtor because
items, but, by
luxury
most of his personal belongings, including
debtor. Two
poorer
the
to
contrast, no such protection is applicable
discussed herein,
recent holdings of a California Court of Appeal,
4
law.
the
of
application
unequal
this
demonstrate
of
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the shortcomings
suggest
to
and
statute
the newly revised household goods exemption
protecting the
legislation which will better accomplish the goal of
creditors.
levying
debtor from being denied the necessities of life by
from
debtor
the
The statute, however, should not operate to insulate
enforcement
his legal and moral obligations by making the creditor's
remedies ineffective.
15 and NewFirst, the cases of Independence Bank v. Heller
represent the
port National Bank v. Adair'" will be discussed. They
exemption which
judicial interpretation of the household goods
Those cases
produces the unsatisfactory results described above.
represent sound
will then be analyzed in depth to determine if they
which their coninterpretations of the statute and the case law on
method
clusions are based. In an effort to identify the most effective
apthe
of
of construction for exemption statutes, a discussion
presented.
then be
proaches that other jurisdictions have used will
goods exemption
household
California's
A proposed revision for
the amount of
clarify
will
statute
statute will follow. The proposed
the need
alleviate
will
and
levy
property which will be exempt from
480 (1860); Los Angeles Fin. Co.
13 Haswell v. Parsons, 15 Cal. 266, 76 Am. Dec.
; North British & Mercantile
(1952)
139
P.2d
243
850,
Supp.
2d
v. Flores, 110 Cal. App.
(1930).
678
P.
292
Ins. Co. v. Ingalls, 109 Cal. App. 147,
Cal. Rptr. 868 (1969),
14 Independence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79
1 (1969).
Rptr.
Cal.
83
1043,
3d
App.
Cal.
2
Newport Nat'l. Bank v. Adair,
15 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1969).
16 2 Cal. App. 3d 1943, 83 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
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for judicial interpretation. It will provide adequate protection
to the
debtor without curtailing the effectiveness of
the creditor's legal
remedies.
Two LIBERAL INTERPRETATIONS: Independence
Bank v. Heller
and Newport National Bank v. Adair
In Independence Bank v. Heller,7 the plaintiff
bank,
recovered a judgment of $80,889.93 against defendant which had
Heller, was
precluded from levying execution against certain
furnishings in
Heller's Beverly Hills apartment. The value
of the furnishings in
question was in excess of $22,000.00. Heller claimed
exemption for
the property as necessary household furnishings
under the provisions
of Code of Civil Procedure section 690.2."8 The
debtor's apartment
was tastefully furnished with many different
pieces of furniture.
The levy of execution was supervised by the
bank's attorney, and
under his direction, the marshal left a refrigerator,
chair, settee,
coffee table, couch, rug, bed, bedding, a television
set, and kitchen
utensils. The seized property was inventoried and
photographed and
amounted to about four hundred pieces. 9
The bank appealed the trial court's determination
that the property claimed by Heller fell within the exemption
law. The facts
were undisputed.2"
On appeal, the court recognized that there was
no precedent on
which to hold that a man who was unable to pay
his debts should be
allowed to remain ensconced in a luxuriously
furnished apartment
and rely on the state exemption statutes in resisting
the efforts of
his creditors to collect their debts. Nevertheless,
the court upheld
the determination of the lower court that nearly
all of the property
in question, which included a number of elaborately
carved wood
tables, sets of china, various styles and types
of drinking glasses,
and serving dishes and platters, was exempt from levy of
execution.2 1
In so holding, the court reasoned that Heller
intended to pay
the debt as soon as he was able, and that the
purchase of the exempted furniture was not made for the purpose
of putting assets
beyond the reach of creditors. Relying on a presumption
in favor of
honest and fair dealing and against fraud, the
court said that it was
not incumbent upon the debtor to prove that
he had honest inten17 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79
Rptr. 868 (1969).
18 Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 723, §Cal.
3, at 1967 (1935), as amended, CAL. Civ. PRO.
CODE
§ 690.1 (West Supp. 1971).
19 275 Cal. App. 2d at 86, 79 Cal. Rptr. at
870 (1969).
20 Id.
21 Id.
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dons, since the bank had introduced no evidence to show that Heller
22
had acted with a fraudulent purpose.
The court mentioned that it was the policy of California courts
to interpret exemption statutes liberally for the benefit of the debtor,
23
and cited three cases as authority. The court then said,
and had
Heller testified he is the son of wealthy parents, was reared
mainhas
he
which
elegance
lived in an atmosphere of affluence and
posis
he
that
signifies
This
apartment.
his
of
furnishing
tained in the
behas
he
which
to
finery
the
sessed of a desire to live in the midst of
come accustomed....
apIt is well settled that in deciding whether furniture or wearing
court
parel is necessary and should be exempted from execution the
comwill consider the station in life of the owner and the manner of
fits
fortable living to which he has become accustomed. . . . The rule
possessions
some
of
ownership
the
protects
into section 690.2 which
are
because of their artistic and cultural value as well as the things that
who
people
that
knowledge
common
of
is
necessary for physical use. It
are
take pride in their homes frequently furnish them with things that
of
china
of
sets
several
as
such
useful
beautiful and elegant as well as
and
styles
different
of
glasses
crystal
of
variety
a
patterns,
different
tables and chairs in excess of the number that are indispensable.
in the statute should not be given
The word 'necessary' as2 used
4
indispensable.
of
the meaning

The court said that this holding was not only for the benefit of
Heller, but for "all persons who furnish their homes in a manner far
above the average." 5 Rationalizing its new rule, the court suggested

be
that since "these are people who pay their bills and will not often
found in court, claiming exemption of their furniture,... the [lower]
court could not . . . restrict Heller's right [to furnish 2his home with
luxuries] merely because he is apparently insolvent."
A judgment debtor's status per se, according to the Heller
decision, should not affect an individual's right to furnish his home
in a luxurious fashion, so long as the judgment creditor brings forth
no evidence to show that the debtor was attempting to put his assets
beyond the reach of creditors. The court attaches very little importance to the fact of the debtor's insolvency, but protects the debtor's
right to add to the essentials of an adequately furnished home.
This case was followed later in the same year by another divi-

"
sion of the same court. Newport National Bank v. Adair held that
22

Id. at 87, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 870.

23 Id. at 88, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 870. See also cases cited note 13, supra.

24 275 Cal. App. 2d at 87, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (1969).
25 Id. at 89, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
26 Id.
27 2 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 83 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
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a judgment debtor whose furniture was appropriate to furnish a
fourteen room home in fashionable Hillsborough, California,
which
rented for $1,250.00 per month, was exempt from levy. The debtor's
claim of exemption stated that the furniture was necessary
within
the meaning of the statute 28 because it was used by the debtor,
his
wife and family, "in their normal, usual, and customary station
in
12 9

life.

The debtor, a self-employed financial agent, had been
earn-

ing between $40,000 and $50,000 per year in recent years. His
home
was the base of his activities, and he occasionally entertained
clients there. He did not, however, claim any of the furniture
in
question under the tools of the trade exemption statute 0
The Newport Bank argued that the test of what is necessary
to
the judgment debtor should be determined in light of the standard
of living that would be reasonable for a judgment debtor rather
than
the standard 9f living which was enjoyed before becoming
a judgment debtor. The court disregarded this argument, allowing
the
exemptions.
The court relied on Heller,8 and on a report of the committee
of the State Bar of California which had investigated the California
exemption statutes. 2 The committee report suggested that
"items
which are necessary for the care and maintenance of the debtor
his family should be exempt regardless of their value."8 8 Since or
the
legislature had not placed a dollar amount on the exemption
provision, the court followed the test which was set forth in Heller,
that
furniture is necessary if it is appropriate to the "station in life
of the
owner and the manner of comfortable living to which he has
become
accustomed." 4 The court concluded by saying that "[p]laintiff's
complaints about the alleged injustice of a judgment debtor's
living
in luxury when he owes money should be addressed to the
Legislature and not to the courts.""8
28 Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 723, § 3, at 1967 (1935),
as amended, CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE

§ 690.1 (West Supp. 1971).
29 2 Cal. App. 3d at 1044, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 2 (1969).
50 See CAL. CrV. PRO. CODE § 690.4 (West Supp.
1971).
31 Independence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal. App. 2d 84,
79 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1969).
82 2 Cal. App. 3d at 1045, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 2 (1969)
; Committee on Debtor and
Creditor, Modernization of Statutory Exemptions, 42 CALIF.
S.B.J. 869 (1967).
33 42 CALIF. S.B.J. at 875. The committee report
stressed the difficulties involved
in making valuations on certain property and suggested
that the exemption statute
would be more effective if items rather than their value
were at issue. The committee
overlooked the problem of quantity, however. In Heller
there were over 400 items at
issue, clearly in excess of the debtor's needs. In Adair, the
issue was whether pieces of
furniture sufficient to complement a fourteen room home
were properly exempt. These
cases present problems which the committee might have
failed to envision.
34 2 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 1046, 83 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1969).
35 Id.
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Io1

EVALUATION OF THE HELLER RATIONALE

provision as
These two cases illustrate that the exemption
for judicial
enacted by the legislature provides no clear 6 standard
is based neither upon
interpretation. The central argument in Heller
but rather upon
the code section itself nor upon prior case holdings,
the holding. The rule
a new rule which the court creates to justify
if it was purchased by
is that the property of the debtor is exempt
is presumedthe debtor for an honest and forthright purpose-this
the reach of
beyond
assets
and not for the purpose of placing
provisions.
exemption
the
of
creditors. The rule misses the point
important.
not
is
purchased
The intent with which the property was
a basic
maintain
to
What matters is whether the property is necessary
standard of living."
authority for the propThe court in Heller cites several cases as
should be liberally interpreted for
osition that exemption statutes
3 8 However, these cases do not support the
the benefit of the debtor
be shown below.
conclusions reached by the court, as will
39
held that the exemption
In Haswell v. Parsons, the court
as to exempt only the number
statute should not be so strictly read
by the debtor and his family.
of beds which would be in constant use
seven beds, the total value
The court upheld exemptions for six or
farmer in Yuba County and
of which was $128. The debtor was a
in a sparsely furnished buildlived with his wife and three children
ing which had once been a hotel.
Ingalls,40 the court
In North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v.
by granting that certain
allowed an exemption for the debtor's widow
would not be exempt
which
proceeds from a life insurance policy,
since she
beneficiary,
the
for the debtor himself, were exempt for
relied
holding
Ingalls
The
was a stranger to the indebtedness.
4 which explained the policy behind
heavily on Holmes v. Marshall,
for the benefit of the
the liberal interpretation of exemption statutes
debtor.4 2
868 (1969).
36 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79 Cal. Rptr.

739, 330 P.2d 829 (1958).
Perfection Paint Prod. v. Johnson, 164 Cal. App. 2d
supra.
38 See cases cited, note 13,
39 15 Cal. 266, 76 Am. Dec. 480 (1860).
(1930).
40 109 Cal. App. 147, 292 P. 678
(1905).
534
P.
79
777,
Cal.
41 145
are enacted on the ground of pub42 "Statutes exempting property from execution
and their families from want
debtors
saving
of
purpose
lic policy for the benevolent
rule now is to construe such
general
The
by reason of misfortune or improvidence.
of the legislature, and the humane
statutes liberally, so as to carry out the intention
535 (1905).
37

at 778-79, 79 P. at
purpose designated by the lawmakers." 145 Cal.
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In Los Angeles Fin. Co. v. Flores,43 the court recognized that
the word "necessary" could have various meanings
and applications
and should be applied to the facts of a case to
carry out the intent
of the legislature. The court ruled against a debtor
who had claimed
exemption of the full amount of his wages. The
statute provided for
exemption of the wages if necessary to the
debtor to provide for
"the common necessaries of life" for himself
and his family." The
debtor had purchased a watch on credit and had
defaulted. The creditor garnished his wages, applying the money
to the purchase price.
The court held that because the watch was
neither necessary nor
practical for the debtor to wear in his work,
his wages could not be
considered exempt with respect to the purchase
of the watch. The
court recognized that the statutes would be liberally
interpreted for
the benefit of the debtor, but held that the debtor
in the present case
did not qualify for such an interpretation.*"
These cases provide little authority for the
holding
that over $22,000.00 worth of admittedly non-essential in Heller
furnishings
should be exempt from levy by a judgment creditor.
Rather,
they are
holdings which merely protect the debtor from
an interpretation of
the statute which would be too harsh or unfair
in the individual
debtor's case. As will be shown below, the
weight of authority
would support a much less generous interpretation.
The cases require
that the debtor bear the burden of proof that
the items claimed for
exemption are necessary to his use.46 They
also require that the
debtor bring himself within the spirit of the exemption
laws.4" They
hold that what is exempt is often a function
of the debtor's individual station in life, which includes his status as
a debtor per se, but
not necessarily social status. 8
The "station in life" test which the Heller court
used was first
mentioned in Estate of Millington."a However,
Millington is shallow
support for the conclusions reached by the Heller
court which allow
the debtor to remain ensconced in luxury even
though insolvent.
The Millington case involves an interpretation
of what is
necessary wearing apparel, and provides a helpful
parallel for deciding what is necessary household furniture. Millington
states:
43 110 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 850,
243 P.2d 139 (1952).
44 Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 723, § 20, at 1970
(1935), as amended, CAL. CIV. PRo. CODE

§ 690.11 (West Supp. 1971).
45 110 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
856, 243 P.2d at 144 (1952).
46 Murphy v. Harris, 77 Cal.at194,
19 P. 377 (1888). See also, CAL. CIV. PRO.
CODE
§ 690.50(i) (West Supp. 1971).
47 Bertozzi v. Swisher, 27 Cal. App.
2d 741, 745, 81 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1939).
48 Estate of Millington, 63 Cal. App.
498, 505, 218 P. 1022, 1025 (1923).
49 63 Cal. App. 498, 218 P.
1022 (1923).

1972]

COMMENTS

The statute expressly makes distinctions in the exemption of property
from execution, based on the occupation or calling of the debtor, but
beyond such express provisions, there can be no distinction based upon
the previous financial condition and social station of the insolvent
debtor; otherwise the statute would operate unequally between the
50
rich and poor.
The court uses a "station in life" test as a means of determin-

ing whether a certain article of clothing would be considered neces-

sary, and explains that "[i]n determining whether any article of
apparel claimed to be exempt by a debtor is necessary for his use,
it would seem logical to inquire whether it is reasonable and proper
for use in the home and in social intercourse in view of the debtor's
insolvency."'" This point is ignored in Heller. Where the Heller
court says that the previous social condition of the debtor is justification for a liberal interpretation of the statute, Millington states:
[T]he previous financial condition and social station of the debtor may
properly be considered in determining whether the article sought to be
exempted was acquired in good faith for the purpose for which the exemption is claimed, or for the purpose of defrauding creditors in conbut beyond this it is not conceived that they
templation of insolvency,
52
factors.
material
are

Millington further limits the "station in life" test by explaining that
"[t] he purpose of the exemption laws is to save debtors and their
families from want, not to enable them to wear luxurious ornaments
3
at the expense of their creditors.""
The parallel between the Heller case and the Millington case
is clear. Where luxurious ornaments of wearing apparel should not
be exempt, neither should admittedly non-essential pieces of household furnishings. The debtor's status as debtor should not be disregarded; the social status of the individual before he became a debtor
is material only as evidence that he may not have purchased the
items to defraud his creditors. The purpose of the exemption laws is
to protect the debtor from losing the necessary appurtenances of
life,54 but not to maintain a lavishly furnished apartment, nor to
wear luxurious ornaments while indebted to others.
55
In Los Angeles Fin. Co. v. Flores, a case which Heller
uses as authority for the "station in life" argument, the court states:
50 Id. at 502, 218 P. at 1023.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 502, 218 P. at 1024 (emphasis added).
53 Id. at 504, 218 P. at 1025.
54 Perfection Paint Prod. v. Johnson, 164 Cal. App. 2d 739, 742, 330 P.2d 829,
831 (1958).
55 110 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 850, 243 P.2d 139 (1952).
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Necessary wearing apparel, as used in Code of Civil Procedure, section
690.2, under the decisions, means necessary to the particular debtor
considering all circumstances-his station in life, his particular type of

employment, etc. .

.

.A tuxedo may be necessary wearing apparel to

a waiter at a top notch cafe, but not to a laborer ....
"56

"Station in life," then, refers to a particular need or occupation,
not to social status. This indicates that a liberal interpretation
should be given to the exemption statutes to assure that clothing
which may be of special need to a debtor in earning his living
would be exempt, but it certainly does not say that social status
should be considered so that once one has accumulated a large
quantity of luxurious furniture he therefore has a right to be undisturbed in his comforts, even when he is unable to pay his bills.
Heller's furniture probably could not reasonably be classified
as necessary to his particular occupation. Even though he was an
interior decorator, he did not claim any of the furniture under the
tools of the trade exemption as he might have done.57 Interior
decorators normally conduct their business on the premises to be
decorated, or often consult with clients in an office or furniture
store. The furnishings in the decorator's own home would very
seldom have any relevance to the decorating problems of an individual client.
It might be argued that the necessary household goods exemption should be interpreted in light of the occupational needs of the
debtor even where he does not claim the property under the specific
tools of the trade exemption. The policy of the court should rightly
be designed to protect the debtor who demonstrates a real need for
a particular exemption. In the Heller59 case, however, the debtor
was not in need of court protection. He was a man living in comfort,
even though insolvent.
The court misread the statute when it held that "[h]anging
pictures, drawings, paintings . ..are included as household furniture not because they are suitable for physical use but because they
contribute to the pleasure and comfort of the owner and perhaps
his pride of ownership." ' 0 The court seems to place great importance
on the aesthetic and decorative adjuncts to the debtor's condition.
In fact, the statute provides only for the exemption of family art,
56 Id. at 856, 243 P.2d at 143.
57 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 690.4 (West Supp.
1971).
58 Telephone interview, December 21, 1971 with Mrs. Rhodes,
interior decorator,
Breuners furniture store, 525 East Hamilton, Campbell, California.
59 Independence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868
(1969).
60 Id. at 88, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
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not art per se. 61 Pictures of the family or paintings done by the
debtor himself are likely to have great sentimental value and probably little commercial value. The 1970 version of the exemption
statute more clearly expresses the exemption, but it is nevertheless
discernable in the older version." There is case authority which so
63
holds. In Hamaker v. Heffron, the court held that oil paintings
which were not shown to be family portraits nor painted by a member of the family were not exempt.
should be considered
The legislature did not intend that items
64 Such an interpretation
only.
decorative
necessary if they were
would not be easy to support, as can be seen when reading other
sections of the exemption provisions. For example, the automobile
of the debtor is exempt only if it is worth not more than $1,000 and
the debtor's equity is not greater than $350.65 The value of commercial equipment and tools of the trade exempted is limited to
$2,500.66 A conclusion that the legislature intended that luxurious
furnishings should be included within the meaning of necessary
household furnishings would hardly67 be reasonable when the exemption provisions are read as a whole.
The court in Heller creates an invalid dichotomy when it states,
"[t]he word 'necessary' as used in the statute should not be given
68
the meaning of indispensable." This reasoning suggests that there
is no middle ground between luxury items and indispensable items.
With the exception of Heller and Adair, the cases mentioned above
are ample evidence that the courts can determine the amount of
property which would be reasonable under the exemption provision.
Next in its analysis the Heller court refers to a "rule" under
which the courts "give consideration" to the custom of some persons
to embellish their homes by "adding to the bare essentials articles
which they consider necessary to their pleasure, convenience, and
comfort."69 The court cited no authority which would suggest that
such a rule had been recognized in the past. No court has held that
what the debtor considers necessary to his pleasure, convenience,
and comfort is necessarily controlling in determining whether certain
property is exempt. Perhaps courts might reasonably "give consid61 Cal. Stats. 1935,

§ 690.1

02

ch. 723, § 3, at 1967 (1935), as amended, CAL. CIV.

(West Supp. 1971).

Id.

63 148 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 737 (1949).
4 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 690.1 (West Supp. 1971).

65 Id. § 690.2.
66 Id. § 690.4.
67 Id. §§ 690-690.29.
68 275 Cal. App. 2d at 88, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (1969).
69 Id.
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eration" to the debtor's personal customs and habits, but certainly
the court should not be bound by them. The determination the court
must make is necessarily a subjective evaluation of what is ordinarily and reasonably necessary to the use of the debtor. Mr. Heller's
furniture requirements would more appropriately be described as
extravagant than necessary. The only case authority for the Heller
rule might be the cases which suggest a liberal interpretation in
favor of the debtor to insure effective compliance with the intent of
the statute. As was shown above, however, those cases work to avoid
hardships rather than to preserve a luxurious standard of living.7"
The most disturbing aspect of the court's new rule of recognizing this act of "adding to the bare essentials" is that the court
elevates this practice to the status of a right which the court feels
obligated to protect. The court feels that "[a] 11persons who furnish
their homes in a manner far above the average' would be left unprotected without this judicial assistance. This notion of the court
in Heller disregards the impact of the decision on the creditor. As
precedent, this case effectively could be used to exempt almost all
personal property which a debtor feels he would like to keep to remain comfortable. Having no fear that a creditor might deprive him
of the comforts and pleasures of life, the debtor becomes insulated
from personal accountabilty for his debts. Such a diminution of the
creditor's leverage over the debtor increases the risk of loss. This
risk increases the cost of credit, a cost which is almost inevitably
passed on to the consumer. Thus, the attempt of the Heller court to
protect the debtor can actually work against the debtor's best
interests.
The Heller decision also represents judicial enforcement of
invidious social discrimination. Innocent on its face, the holding in
reality works unfairly against the poor. Under Heller, a rich man can
keep his wealth merely by showing that he was wealthy before he
became indebted to the levying creditor. The poor man, however,
who has very little in the way of worldly goods would likely lose
anything which might be inconsistent with his basic life style. A rich
man could keep a Picasso drawing worth thousands of dollars because it brought him pleasure and was a tasteful addition to a
beautifully furnished home. A poor man, who might be an art lover
but lives in modest surroundings, would undoubtedly lose such an
extravagant possession. The drawing might actually have much more
meaning to the poor man because of its special prominence in an
otherwise drab environment, but because the poor man would be
70 See cases cited note 13, supra.
71 275 Cal. App. 2d at 88, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (1969).
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unable to prove that the drawing fits in with his life style, it would
not be exempt. Likewise, the more profligate spender who furnished
his home with many luxury items would fare much better than the
prudent man who spent his money on tools of his trade. He would be
72
limited to only $2,500 worth of tools, while the luxurious furnishings would remain exempt. Such unequal application of the law to
debtor, is subject to
the same class of citizen, i.e. the judgment
73
amendment.
fourteenth
the
question under
The Supreme Court has recognized that statutes which make
discriminatory classifications based on wealth are suspect and require careful scrutiny by the Court to insure that they are not in
74
violation of the fourteenth amendment. The Court decided over
twenty years ago that a court decision could be considered state
75
action and thus within the purview of the fourteenth amendment.
A growing body of law under the equal protection clause to the
fourteenth amendment has come to treat the unequal impact of
certain state activities because of a citizen's individual wealth, or
lack of wealth, as invidious discrimination which the amendment
forbids.7 6 Judgment debtors, whether rich or poor, are entitled to
the equal protection of laws equally enforced, and the Heller doctrine cannot be reconciled with that requirement.
Newport NationalBank v. Adair7 7 closely follows the reasoning
and parallels the results in Heller. It directly refutes the holding in
Estate of Millington,"' a case which emphasized that the status of
judgment debtor is to be strongly considered in interpreting the
statute.7 9 Adair is significant only because it represents an affirmation of the reasoning and the conclusions reached by the Heller
court.
EXEMPTION STATUTES: DESIGN AND POLICY

Because the statute which exempts necessary household furnishings and wearing apparel, even in its newly revised form, is
72 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 690.4 (West Supp. 1971).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

74 See generally Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
75 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
76 Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81
HARV. L. REV. 435 (1967). This note discusses recent Supreme Court holdings invalidating state laws which effectively denied poor criminal defendants certain state services,
such as reproduction of the transcripts of their trials, which were available to defendants who had money to pay the required fees.
77 2 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 83 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
78 63 Cal. App. 498, 218 P. 1022 (1923).
79 See text accompanying notes 53-54, supra.
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inadequate to preclude further holdings such as Heller and Adair,
section 690.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure" ° should be rewritten
so as to better effect the legislative intent. Exemption provisions are
purely matters of legislative policy,8 1 and should be written effectively so as to carry out that policy.
Exemption statutes in California are of three basic types. Those
which exempt specific items, 2 those which give specific dollar
exemptions,' and those which combine an item description with a
dollar limitation. 4
Statutes which name specific items give the greatest guidance
to the levying officer. However, they can be unworkable when they
employ broadly inclusive terms such as household goods. Specific
mention of items can be helpful to the sheriff, for he knows that he
cannot take the California debtor's piano, television set, shotgun,
radio, or rifle. Those which give specific dollar exemptions are also
clear. A look at the debtor's bank accounts will identify any nonexempt moneys. The combination provisions give maximum flexibility but involve the problems of the other types of statutes. Will
retail, wholesale, or replacement value be used?85 The sheriff has
the burden of assessing the value, regardless of which standard is
used. This type of provision allows the debtor to choose which items
he would like to claim as exempt, possibly avoiding an unfair result.
For example, the debtor under the tools of the trade exemption
would be allowed to pick the tools he considers most valuable to him,
up to the $2,500.00 limitation. 8
The various states have devised many approaches to achieving
the goals of the exemption statutes. 8T The federal government has
80 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE

§ 690.1 (West Supp. 1971).
81 Spence v. Smith, 121 Cal. 536, 538, 53 P. 653, 654 (1898) ; In re Klemp,
119
Cal. 41, 43, 50 P. 1062, 1063 (1897).
"Debtors have, of course, no common law or inherent right to exemptions, homesteads, or to withhold any of their property from levy by their creditors.
. . . The
exemptions and the homestead provisions are an attempt on the part of the
legislature
to reconcile the rights between creditor and debtor consistent with providing
a modest
home for the debtor and his family and the basic tools or equipment to enable
him to
earn a living for his family so as not to become a charge upon society." Rifkin,
Archaic
Exemption Laws, 39 CALIF. S.B.J. 370 (1964).
82 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 690.5, 690.29 (West Supp. 1971).
83 Id. § 690.7.
84 Id. §§ 690.2-4.
85 "[T]he word 'value,' when not qualified by context or circumstances, has
often
been defined as meaning 'market value,' which is not what the owner could have
realized
at a forced sale, but the price he could obtain after reasonable and ample time
...
"
Wade v. Rathbun, 23 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 758, 760, 67 P.2d 765, 766 (1937).
86 CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE § 690.4 (West Supp. 1971).
87 For example, Michigan limits its household goods exemption to a maximum
of
$1,000 worth of furniture, utensils, books, and appliances. MicH. CoMP. LAws
ANN.
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8
also provided exemptions for the tax debtor1 The Internal Revenue
Code describes the property exempt from levy as necessary wearing
apparel, school books for the taxpayer and his family, fuel and
provisions, and furniture and personal effects to a value of $500.9
To solve the problem of valuation, the Code directs the Secretary or
his delegate to summon three disinterested persons who will make
the valuation.9" Finally, the section provides that no property or
rights to property other than those which are specifically mentioned
in the provision will be exempt. 9'

Congress has decided to limit the exemptions for tax debtors
to a small and exclusive list of items, while the states have generally
taken a less severe approach. Perhaps Congress feels that the
federal government's interest in quick and efficient settlement of tax
claims is of greater importance than the debtor's comfort. The state
laws, on the other hand, reflect a greater concern for the individual
debtor. The vested interest that the federal government is protecting
in its exemption provisions is missing in the state setting. Moreover,
the individual states must frequently bear the heavy cost of support
for its indigents.
In general, federal and state exemption provisions are less
generous than the California exemption laws. They represent a
determination on the part of the various state legislatures and the
Congress that certain necessary items should be exempt from levy.
They certainly do not indicate that the debtor is to be granted
immunity from the loss of items which are not necessary to the
maintenance of a modest standard of living.
A

RECOMMENDED STATUTE

In view of the inadequacy of the present exemption provision as
discussed above, the following revision of Code of Civil Procedure
§ 600.6023 (1968) ; A basic estate of $2,000 is allowed in Virginia, and in addition, all
necessary wearing apparel, the family Bible, and pictures, etc. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26
(1970) ; The State of Washington exempts all of the wearing apparel of each member
of the family, the family library to the extent of $500, and beds, bedding, and furnishings to the value of $500. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.16.020 (Supp. 1971). Wisconsin
exempts the family Bible, school books, and family pictures; it also limits the amount
of wearing apparel to a value of $400 and household goods and cooking utensils to only
$200. WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 272.18 (1958). In Indiana, exemption laws are required as a
matter of constitutional law: "The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life, shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of
property from seizure or sale for the payment of a debt . . . ." IND. CONST. art. I § 22.
88 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6334.
89 Id.
9o Id.
91 Id.
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690.1 is suggested. The property mentioned below would be exempt
from execution:
690.1 Necessary Household Furnishings, Wearing Apparel,
Family Art
(a) Necessary household furnishings and appliances ordinarily and reasonably used by the debtor and his resident family,
not to exceed $2,500.00 in value. Single items which would
reasonably be expected to provide a high return at an execution
sale shall not be exempt unless claimed by the debtor to be a
family keepsake. Claim for such exemption is to be made according to the provisions of section 690.50.
(b) Necessary wearing apparel ordinarily and reasonably
used by the debtor and his resident family, not to exceed $500.00
in value for each member of the resident family. Single items
such as jewelry, fur coats, and watches, in excess of $100.00 in
value, shall not be exempt unless claimed by the debtor to be a
family keepsake. Claim for such exemption is to be made according to the provisions of section 690.50.
(c) Works of art shall not be exempt within section (a)
unless of or by the debtor or his family. If the debtor or family
artist sells his paintings or drawings as his primary occupation,
however, only paintings of the family shall be exempt.
(d) The value of items claimed to be exempt will be measured by normal market retail price. Items will be assessed in
value in their present condition, not by replacement cost or value
when they were purchased. Disagreements as to valuation of
specific items will be resolved as provided in section 690.50.
The above provision uses the combination approach of listing
the type of items to be exempt, but limiting the total exemption by a
dollar amount. As discussed above, this approach offers the greatest
degree of flexibility while giving adequate guidance to those responsible for implementation and enforcement. The provisions of the
present statute name the types of items to be exempt but omit a
dollar limitation. The Heller and Adair cases illustrate the inappropriate results which are possible with such a statutory flaw. The
proposed section will preclude such holdings.
Since used furniture and clothing seldom command the price
originally paid, most of the furnishings and clothing of the average
debtor should be protected by the suggested provision. The expensive
individual items such as color television sets, pianos, and stereo
phonograph systems should be subject to execution. These are

19721

COMMENTS

11

when he
luxury items which the debtor should be expected to forgo
demand that
is unable to pay his bills. Basic standards of fairness
to enforce his
the creditor have access to an effective legal remedy
can hardly be
judgment. Precluding the exemption of luxury items
considered unfair to the debtor.
keepThe proposed statute provides an exception for the family
In
antique.
valuable
a
be
might
sake, not presently available, which
proas
exemption
the
for
such case, the debtor may make a claim
the debtor
vided for in section 690.50.92 The burden of proof is on
keepsake.
or
heirloom
to convince the court that the item is a family
should
generations
An item which has been handed down through the
return
high
a
bring
rightly be exempt, even though it may possibly
debtor
at an execution sale. An antique purchased by an extravagant
should be leviable.
Works of art should not be leviable if they are family portraits
or works of the amateur family member. In all likelihood they would
or
provide a modest return at an execution sale. A professional artist
in
photographer, however, should not enjoy an exemption that those
other businesses would not be allowed. A typical merchant's inventory is leviable; so should the artist's stock on hand. If the debtor
makes it his business to sell his creations in the market, he should
works in
not be entitled to preferential treatment. If he has sold his
not
should
he
levy,
of
time
the
at
sale
the past and has his works on
indebtedness.
his
satisfy
to
be heard to complain of their sale
CONCLUSION

The recommended statute will not be the panacea for all exemphave to be
tion problems. With time, the dollar amount will possibly
is still
revalued to offer the same degree of protection. The debtor
and
required to pick and choose which items he will claim as exempt
auction.
at
which items he will release to the levying officer for sale
The purpose of the exemption statutes is not to avoid all unpleasantsuggested
ness which results from one's insolvency. The new section
the present
herein would, however, avoid the inequalities inherent in
code section. The Mr. Hellers and Mr. Adairs would be specifically
under
limited in the amount of personal property they might keep
social
past
or
present
their
of
regardless
the exemption provisions,
living.
of
status, station in life, or standard
The law should be written and enforced to promote maximum
fairness to both debtor and creditor. The law should not be written
92 CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE § 690.50 (West Supp. 1971).
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so as to protect those who lend money or extend
credit for profit
from the risks of enterprise. The law is rightly
invoked to protect
the debtor from want due to improvidence or misfortune.
However,
the law should not be invoked so as to shield
the debtor from personal accountability to his creditors while he
enjoys the pleasures
and comforts of wealth that are purely apparent.
Daniel H. Dahlen

